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Back in October 2022, as Rishi Sunak assumed office as the UK's leader, he was the fifth consecutive UK leader to take up the position in six years.

Triggered in the UK by Britain's EU exit, this signified exceptional governmental instability. So how might we describe what is occurring in France, now on its sixth prime minister in two years – with three in the last ten months?

The current premier, the newly reinstated Sébastien Lecornu, may have gained a brief respite on that day, abandoning Emmanuel Macron’s key pension reform in exchange for opposition Socialist votes as the cost of his administration's continuation.

But it is, at best, a short-term solution. The EU’s second-largest economy is trapped in a political permacrisis, the likes of which it has not experienced for many years – possibly not since the start of its Fifth French Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no simple way out.

Minority Rule

Essential context: from the moment Macron called an ill-advised snap general election in 2024, France has had a hung parliament split into three opposing factions – the left, the far right and his own centrist coalition – without any group holding a clear majority.

Simultaneously, the nation faces twin financial emergencies: its debt-to-GDP ratio and deficit are now nearly double the EU limit, and hard constitutional deadlines to pass a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are approaching.

Against that unforgiving backdrop, both the prime ministers before Lecornu – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who held the position from December 2024 to September 2025 – were ousted by the assembly.

In September, the president appointed his close ally Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu presented his government team – which turned out to be much the same as the old one – he faced fury from allies and opponents alike.

So much so that the next day, he stepped down. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in recent French history. In a dignified speech, he cited political rigidity, saying “party loyalties” and “personal ambitions” would make his job virtually unworkable.

Another twist in the tale: just hours after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron asked him to stay on for two more days in a final attempt to secure multi-party support – a task, to put it mildly, filled with challenges.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs publicly turned on the embattled president. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and radical left France Unbowed (LFI) refused to meet Lecornu, vowing to reject all future administrations unless there were snap elections.

Lecornu stuck at his job, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the end of his 48 hours, he appeared on television to say he believed “a path still existed” to prevent a vote. The leader's team announced the president would appoint a new prime minister two days later.

Macron kept his promise – and on that Friday appointed … Sébastien Lecornu, again. So this week – with Macron helpfully sniping from the sidelines that the nation's opposing groups were “creating discord” and “solely responsible for this chaos” – was Lecornu’s critical test. Could he survive – and can he pass that vital budget?

In a critical address, the young prime minister spelled out his budget priorities, giving the Socialist party, who oppose Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were waiting for: Macron’s flagship reform would be frozen until 2027.

With the right-wing LR already on board, the Socialists said they would not back censorship votes tabled against Lecornu by the far right and radical left – meaning the administration would likely endure those ballots, due on Thursday.

It is, nevertheless, by no means certain to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS explicitly warned that it would be demanding further compromises. “This move,” said its head, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”

Changing Political Culture

The problem is, the greater concessions he makes to the left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, like the PS, the conservatives are themselves split on dealing with the administration – certain members remain eager to bring it down.

A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how difficult his mission – and longer-term survival – will be. A combined 264 lawmakers from the RN, LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR seek his removal.

To achieve that, they need a majority of 288 votes in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 deputies or the LR’s 47 representatives (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth unstable premier in two years is, similar to his forerunners, toast.

Most expect this to occur soon. Although, by an unlikely turn, the dysfunctional assembly musters collective will to approve a budget this year, the prospects for the government beyond that look bleak.

So is there a way out? Early elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: surveys indicate pretty much every party bar the RN would see reduced representation, but there would still be no clear majority. A new prime minister would confront identical numerical challenges.

An alternative might be for Macron himself to resign. After winning the presidential election, his replacement would dissolve parliament and aim for a legislative majority in the following election. But this also remains unclear.

Surveys show the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an odds-on chance that French electorate, having elected a far-right president, might think twice about handing them control of parliament.

In the end, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its leaders acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that decisive majorities are a bygone phenomenon, winner-takes-all no longer applies, and compromise is not synonymous with failure.

Many think that transformation will not be feasible under the country’s current constitution. “This isn't a standard political crisis, but a crise de régime” that will prove anything but temporary.

“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and even disincentivizes – the emergence of governing coalitions typical across Europe. The Fifth Republic could be in its final stage.”